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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Erik Sirri
By Mercedes Cardona
Erik Sirri served as director of the Division of Trading and Markets at the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) from 2006 to 2009. In his post, he was responsible for matters
relating to the regulation of stock and option exchanges, national securities associations,
brokers-dealers, clearing agencies, transfer agents, and credit rating agencies. Before joining
the SEC in 1996, he was an assistant professor of finance at the Harvard Business School from
1989 to 1995. Sirri served as the SEC’s chief economist until 1999, before returning to academia.
He is currently a professor of finance at Babson College. His research interests include the
interaction of securities law and finance, securities market structure, investment management,
and capital markets. This Lesson Learned is based on an interview with Sirri held in May 2021;
the full transcript may be accessed here.
Consolidated agency oversight of economically similar financial activities will
improve each regulator’s ability to evaluate risk and recognize vulnerabilities.
In the years leading to the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis, US financial regulators (of
which there are five at the federal level) generally lacked a consolidated view of the
significant amount of risk and leverage that accumulated outside of the commercial financial
institutions. The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999 did not provide for consolidated
supervision of investment bank holding companies. The SEC lacked the supervisory
authority by statute that would have allowed it to see some of the warning signs of the
coming crisis; its oversight was limited to broker-dealers and did not extend to their holding
company parents, which may have had questionable holdings or unreasonable leverage
within other subsidiaries.
The collapse of Bear Stearns showed how quickly liquidity can vanish from a firm that has
trouble at one of its affiliates, but Sirri noted that a year and a half before its demise, Bear
Stearns had its most profitable year ever. From the SEC’s limited vantage point, the financial
system seemed to be in good shape, not a teetering framework, he said.
In retrospect there was a regulatory hole there, and Congress should probably have
filled it. You didn’t want firms as big as our investment banks running around without
consolidated supervision, or certainly without the ability for someone to . . . look
holistically at the risks and the amount of liquidity across the whole entity. There was
no one to do that, and these were big, important firms.
The Office of Thrift Supervision was the only regulator that had statutory supervision over
any holding companies, namely those that also owned a thrift institution. But it failed to
exercise that oversight in the lead-up to the crisis.
Lacking statutory consolidated supervisory authority, the various agencies needed to work
together to provide that holistic view of risk. Agencies including the SEC, the Federal Reserve
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System, and the Treasury Department, among others, failed to communicate effectively
across the fragmented regulatory regime that also included the Treasury’s Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
The authority was divided, and they did not all play ball well. I think that was one
thing that was unfortunate. But this is politics. Regulatory entities want to defend
their own turf, so that’s somewhat to be expected.
To be effective, oversight must be based in statutory authority, have real legitimacy
behind it, and include the power of enforcement.
The SEC gained some broad-based supervisory authority of broker-dealers and their holding
companies through rulemaking, rather than statute, with mixed results, said Sirri. A 2004
SEC rule established a voluntary oversight program of consolidated supervisory entities
(CSEs)—holding companies that agreed to increased supervision by the SEC. This was meant
to fulfill consolidated supervision requirements that firms had to comply with to do business
in the European Union. In exchange, the SEC offered them a carrot. He said,
What the 2004 rules did was a trade-off. The SEC gained oversight and some
transparency into the risks at the holding company level. That was something that it
did not have before. It didn’t do it by statute; it did it by rule. It could look at the risks
and see the risk controls at the level of the holding company of the big investment
banks. The 2004 rules also let the SEC require a pool of unrestricted liquidity at the
holding company level. The SEC had not been able to implement these regulations
before. In exchange, it gave the investment banks an alternate method for computing
the required level of broker-dealer capital that they held.
That trade-off of a computation method for broker-dealers in exchange for oversight over
the holding company gave rise to the notion that the SEC had lifted limits on leverage across
financial firms, leading to the crisis. Sirri explained,
It allowed for the computation of actual broker-dealer capital using a different
measure. That’s all it did, and in particular, it did not change the required brokerdealer capital. At these firms, their broker-dealers didn't fall out of capital compliance.
They didn't run into a situation where they ran out of capital. The problems arose at
the holding company level, where the SEC had a window into what was going on, but
we didn't have statutory oversight. Then people started thinking the SEC allowed a
ton of leverage to occur in these firms at the parent level. We couldn’t have stopped
them from taking holding company leverage. We didn’t have the authority to do that.
The CSE program tried to create a holistic supervisory system over holding companies, but
it didn’t have enough authority. Sirri pondered: If the SEC not stepped in with rulemaking,
might Congress have felt the need to act, or might the Federal Reserve have assumed
supervision? Having only supervisory authority over broker-dealers, once the crisis
exploded, the SEC’s role was limited. It couldn’t provide the necessary liquidity to affected
firms, as the Fed was able to do, and its assigned functions couldn’t stabilize the markets.
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